The Blanshard Entailment and the Madden Natural Necessity Views of Causality

Idealistic Studies 10 (1):40-45 (1980)
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Abstract

In a previous issue of this journal, Professor R. A. Oakes compared Blanshard’s version of the entailment view of causality with Professor E. H. Madden’s version of the natural necessity view of causality [5]. Professor Oakes, after considering their alleged differences, asserted that these two views were the same. In the same issue, Professor Madden replied to Oakes’ remarks with a list of characteristics which allegedly distinguished his natural necessity view from the entailment view [3]. In what follows I propose that Madden’s list of differentiating characteristics contains no essential, irreconcilable element which separates his view from Blanshard’s. Additionally, I will consider several features of the Madden and Blanshard views not considered by either Madden or Oakes in their articles which do in fact irreconcilably distinguish them.

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