Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390 (2014)

Authors
Rosanna Keefe
University of Sheffield
Abstract
Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis
Keywords Logical pluralism  Logical consequence  Non-classical logics   Reasoning
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0333-x
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References found in this work BETA

Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
Counterlogicals as Counterconventionals.Alexander W. Kocurek & Ethan J. Jerzak - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):673-704.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

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Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
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