Abstract

History and Legend are, Professor Robin believes, traditionally misconceived in being conceived as in conflict. To write history is either to destroy utterly the claim of some legend to be veridical, or else to rediscover, behind what is imaginary or fabulous in it, indications of what the facts really were. Such is the accredited view. But, asks M. Robin, is not legend, on the contrary, a positive element in history? And he answers in effect that nowhere is legend more regular, indeed more necessary, than in its contribution to the history of philosophy, ancient and modern. This history has a wholly original character. It does not resemble the history of the sciences; for this relates either the checkmates in research—instructive to be sure, but dead for future science—or else its victories—equally instructive, though only their results survive. Nor does it resemble literary history; for even if this be accompanied by evaluatory criticism, seldom is interpretation of doctrine admitted. Interpreting a philosophy is seizing not only its literal sense, but above all its import and efficacy. It is a continuously creative and reflective activity which unceasingly quickens the materials on which it reflects. But since what is called objectivity cannot be attained by the historian of philosophy except by shutting his eyes to the limits of his powers, he must candidly confess—and without admitting that the confession impairs the value of his effort—that objectivity cannot be his chief end. No great philosophy can really be considered dead, its sincere and sympathetic evocation is always possible. The history of philosophy is philosophy; it is philosophy philosophizing on its past efforts, and contemplating itself in the perenniality of its changing existence