Aristotle, Protagoras, and Contradiction: Metaphysics Γ 4-6

Journal of Ancient Philosophy 7 (2):75-99 (2013)
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Abstract

In both Metaphysics Γ 4 and 5 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that all contradictions are true. Yet Aristotle’s arguments are not transparent, and later, in Γ 6, he provides Protagoras with a way to escape contradictions. In this paper I try to understand Aristotle’s arguments. After examining a number of possible solutions, I conclude that the best way of explaining them is to (a) recognize that Aristotle is discussing a number of Protagorean opponents, and (b) import another of Protagoras’ views, namely the claim that there are always two logoi opposed to one another.

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Evan Keeling
University of São Paulo

Citations of this work

When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch.Ian McCready-Flora - 2019 - Ancient Philosophy Today 1 (2):171-191.

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