Responsibility for necessities

Philosophical Studies 155 (2):307-324 (2011)
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Abstract

It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples

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Stephen Kearns
Florida State University

Citations of this work

Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.
Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice.Fabio Lampert & Pedro Merlussi - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):445-469.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Essays in quasi-realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Essays on Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):96-99.

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