Commitment, Norm-Governedness and Guidance

Acta Analytica 36 (2):213-228 (2021)
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Abstract

A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no-guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as commitments whose discharging requires complying with certain norms is preferable because it both respects the insight provided while remaining unscathed by the problems besetting this conception of normativity.

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Alireza Kazemi
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences

Citations of this work

Still Committed to the Normativity of Folk Psychology.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74.
Still Committed to the Normativity of Folk Psychology.Alireza Kazemi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):58-74.

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