The Virtue of Playing Along

Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (1):1-10 (2007)
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Abstract

Because playing along involves pretence, it is liable to be seen as an objectionable form of deception. In this paper, however, I argue that it is a virtue based on its role in creating and sustaining valuable relationships. According to William of Ockham and Michelle de Montaigne, to love another as a true friend is to will as he or she wills. Given that even the most like-minded individuals often will different things, there is need for a meta-level, at which one can validate the will of the other without actually willing it oneself. This is what it is to play along.

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Sharon Kaye
John Carroll University

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