Confirming (climate) change: a dynamical account of model evaluation

Synthese 200 (2):1-26 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophers of science have offered various accounts of climate model evaluation which have largely centered on model-fit assessment. However, despite the wide-spread prevalence of process-based evaluation in climate science practice, this sort of model evaluation has been undertheorized by philosophers of science. In this paper, I aim to expand this narrow philosophical view of climate model evaluation by providing a philosophical account of process evaluation that is rooted in a close examination of scientific practice. I propose dynamical adequacy as a metric by which scientists test and evaluate models that represent and produce key regional climate processes and features. I argue that process-based evaluation confirms the adequacy of a regional climate model for simulating and predicting future changes of a specific regional climate feature. I offer a case study of how, in practice, scientists establish the reliability of model projections by assessing the dynamical adequacy of such models. I also show how process-based evaluation mitigates some well-known shortcomings of model-fit assessment and supports the adequacy and reliability of climate model projections against philosophical objections, like confirmational holism. Such adequacy is especially important for decision makers who need reliable regional model projections to guide their climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
Climate models and their evaluation.S. Bony, R. Colman & T. Fichefet - 2007 - In S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor & H. L. Miller (eds.), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. pp. 623--624.
Understanding pluralism in climate modeling.Wendy Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.
Model spread and progress in climate modelling.Julie Jebeile & Anouk Barberousse - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-19.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-12

Downloads
11 (#1,113,583)

6 months
6 (#512,819)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Diagnosing errors in climate model intercomparisons.Ryan O’Loughlin - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (2):1-29.
Scaling procedures in climate science: Using temporal scaling to identify a paleoclimate analogue.Aja Watkins - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 102 (C):31-44.

Add more citations

References found in this work

How models are used to represent reality.Ronald N. Giere - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View.Wendy S. Parker - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (3):457-477.
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.
Model robustness as a confirmatory virtue: The case of climate science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.
Holism, entrenchment, and the future of climate model pluralism.Johannes Lenhard & Eric Winsberg - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (3):253-262.

View all 19 references / Add more references