Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):290-294 (2004)
AbstractIt is argued that Block's thought experiment on superblindsight and “the Inverse Anton's syndrome” are not cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness. “Weak dispositional states” should be excluded from the set of A-conscious states, and a subject's being reflectively conscious of a P-conscious state is suggested as a better candidate for A-consciousness. It is further pointed out that dreams, according to Block's own criterion but contrary to what he claims, are A-unconscious and it is argued that Block should not accept the idea that high-information representational content is an empirically sufficient condition of phenomenality in human beings.
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