Moral realism and moral judgments

Erkenntnis 36 (1):103 - 112 (1992)
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Abstract

For moral realists moral judgments will be a kind of factual judgment that involves the basically reliable apprehension of an objective moral reality. I argue that factual judgments display at least some degree of conceptual sensitivity to error, while moral judgments do not. Therefore moral judgments are not a kind of factual judgment.

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Author's Profile

Frederik Kaufman
Ithaca College

References found in this work

Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.Robert Shaver - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):458.
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.Sydney Shoemaker (ed.) - 1963 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Virtues and Vices.Phillipa Foot - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the good life. New York: Oxford University Press.

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