Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259 (1995)
AbstractOne can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.
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P-Consciousness Presentation/a-Consciousness Representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.
Empirical Status of Block's Phenomenal/Access Distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.
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