On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259 (1995)

Abstract

One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.

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Leonard David Katz
Harvard University

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work

Author's Response.Ned Block - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
P-Consciousness Presentation/a-Consciousness Representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.
Empirical Status of Block's Phenomenal/Access Distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.

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