Analog representations and their users

Synthese 193 (3):851-871 (2016)
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Abstract

Characterizing different kinds of representation is of fundamental importance to cognitive science, and one traditional way of doing so is in terms of the analog–digital distinction. Indeed the distinction is often appealed to in ways both narrow and broad. In this paper I argue that the analog–digital distinction does not apply to representational schemes but only to representational systems, where a representational system is constituted by a representational scheme and its user, and that whether a representational system is analog or non-analog depends on facts about that user. This aspect of the distinction has gone unnoticed, and I argue that the failure to notice it can be an impediment to scientific progress

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Matthew Katz
Central Michigan University

Citations of this work

Analogue Computation and Representation.Corey J. Maley - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (3):739-769.

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