Acta Analytica 29 (1):83-98 (2014)

Masashi Kasaki
Hiroshima University
Jennifer Lackey challenges the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle, viz., that knowledge that p is sufficient to rationally act on p, by proposing a set of alleged counterexamples. Her aim is not only to attack the knowledge-action principle, but also to undermine an argument for subject-sensitive invariantism. Lackey holds that her examples are counterexamples to the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle because (a) S knows the proposition in question, but (b) it is not rational for S to act on it. In this paper, first, I argue against (a) on intuitive and on theoretical grounds. Second, I point out that (b), even if combined with (a), is not sufficient to make for counterexamples to the knowledge-action principle of the relevant kind. Third, I offer two alternative explanations of the intuition Lackey relies on. If either one of them is right, (b) may not be satisfied in her examples.
Keywords Subject-Sensitive Invariantism  Knowledge-Action Principle  Isolated Secondhand Knowledge  Testimonial Knowledge  Jennifer Lackey
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-013-0215-3
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.
Knowledge and the Permissibility of Action.N. Pinillos - 2019 - Synthese 196 (5):2021-2043.
"Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University

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