Regan’s Lifeboat Case and the Additive Assumption

In the Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan considers a scenario where one must choose between killing either a human being or any number of dogs by throwing them from a lifeboat. Regan chooses the human being. His justification for this prescription is that the human being will suffer a greater harm from death than any of the dogs would. This prescription has met opposition on the grounds that the combined intrinsic value of the dogs’ experiences outweighs those of a human being. This objection assumes that the intrinsic value of a whole is simply the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. This paper offers a justification for Regan’s prescription that rejects this assumption. It argues that the combined intrinsic value of a human being’s possible experiences might be greater than those of any number of dogs’ because the experiences of dogs do not exhibit sufficient variety for their intrinsic value to be additive.