Why Sufficientarianism is not Indifferent to Taxation

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):81-102 (2015)
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Abstract

The indifference objection is one of the most powerful objections to sufficientarianism. Critics argue that sufficientarianism is objectionably indifferent to the distribution of benefits and burdens. This article focuses on the criticism of the latter, particularly the claim that sufficientarianism is indifferent to taxation. Contrary to this allegation, it is argued that sufficientarianism warrants progressive taxation, the reason being that even those who are sufficiently well off face the risk of being pushed below sufficiency. This risk decreases the better off someone is as it is easier for those who are better off to deal with sufficiency-threatening circumstances. It is argued that the risk of insufficiency understood as a function of distance to the threshold justifies progressive taxation. The proposed line of reasoning corresponds to the sufficientarian belief that there should be no redistribution between the rich, as the differences in risk of insufficiency eventually become marginal among those who are very well off. Moreover, the proposed rationale for progressive taxation does not depend on prioritarian or egalitarian reasoning. Rather, it transpires that sufficientarianism is well-suited to justify the progressive redistributive system of the modern welfare state.

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Philipp Kanschik
Humboldt-University, Berlin

References found in this work

Necessity, Volition, and Love.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Equality as a moral ideal.Harry Frankfurt - 1987 - Ethics 98 (1):21-43.
Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2002 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 81-125.
Why sufficiency is not enough.Paula Casal - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):296-326.

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