Kant Studien 100 (1):28-52 (2009)

The concept of necessity plays a central role in Kant's philosophy, but seems to lead to severe paradoxes. On the one hand he states: ‘Notwendigkeit und strenge Allgemeinheit sind sichere Kennzeichen einer Erkenntnis a priori’. On the other hand he talks also about ‘notwendig (d. i. nach einer Regel)’, which means ‘necessary according to the empirical natural laws’. However, he never states explicitly the distinction between these two different concepts of necessity. Either Kant's philosophy is inconsistent or we have to assume that he indeed interchanges two different concepts, even if he does not tell us that there is a difference between synthetic apriori necessity and natural necessity. This paper defends the hypothesis of two different necessities and then shows how this strategy makes possible a rational reconstruction of Kant's epistemology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/KANT.2009.002
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,436
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Kant-Bibliographie 2009.Margit Ruffing - 2011 - Kant Studien 102 (4):499-540.
Empirical legality and effective reality.Hernán Pringe - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (158):21-39.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
51 ( #224,353 of 2,520,399 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,718 of 2,520,399 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes