Presuppositions of the Scientific Ethics of John Dewey

Dissertation, Depaul University (1996)
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Abstract

The purpose of this study is the explication of John Dewey's attempt to introduce the second Copernican Revolution. Dewey's second Copernican revolution denotes an ambitious project to accomplish for all humane and social subjects, especially the field of value, what the scientific revolution accomplished for natural sciences. It is an attempt to extend the method of experimental science into the field of morality, attempt to solve moral predicament through the application of the method of experimental science. Great obstacles stand in the way of such a project. A dualistic interpretation of reality and the consequent tendency of keeping value either in the transcendental realm or in the subjective mind remain as an impediment for introducing the second Copernican revolution or constructing the scientific ethics. Dewey confronts and solves difficulties arising from polarities such as mind/body, subject/object, experience/nature etc., by introducing his concept of being-in-interaction or the transactional approach. Dewey's method for solving the difficulties arising from dualistic ontology is to question the very premises upon which the difficulties are based. As far as traditional philosophical difficulties originating from dualistic ontology are concerned, Dewey does not solve them, but rather he gets over them by introducing his transactional approach. ;His transactional approach accomplishes two things which are required for the construction of scientific ethics: first, it brings human beings into nature, and second, it naturalizes values. Values, according to Dewey, do not have either their origin or locus in some supernatural realm, transcendental law, divine commandment or in subjective mind. Rather, values are distinguishable experiences of human beings interacting with their environment, produced with the contrivance of intelligence and activity. For Dewey, there are no characteristics of ethical subject-matter or deliberation which preclude the use of experimental procedures or require other than the method of experimental science. This study is designed to show that the validity of this claim is predicated upon Dewey's treatment of issues such as the continuity between mind and body, subject and object, experience and nature, and nature of value, nature of experimental science and the function of ethical theory. In other words, this study attempts to explicate the presuppositions based on which Dewey tries to introduce a second Copernican revolution

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