Abstract

James R. Otteson’s Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life is a wide-ranging examination of Smith’s moral philosophy which closely analyzes the notions of sentiment, sympathy, general rules, the impartial spectator, and other related topics. Otteson assesses Smith’s account of moral development and considers the extent to which Smith’s moral sentimentalism is both descriptive and prescriptive. He also discusses Smith’s views on the relationship between unintended order and final causes. Finally, Otteson finds contemporary support for some of Smith’s claims about human nature in the work of sociologist James Q. Wilson. Although much in Otteson’s rich book invites comment, I will limit myself, for reasons of space, to outlining and briefly considering two of its main theses: According to Adam Smith, moral standards have emerged, and continue to emerge, from a market-like exchange of sentiments among mutually sympathizing actors; We can reconcile Smith’s claim, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that benevolence as an important human motive, with the discussion in The Wealth of Nations, which seemingly reduces all behavior to self-interest.