Hegel, Recognition, and Same‐Sex Marriage

Journal of Social Philosophy 46 (2):226-241 (2015)
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Abstract

To understand Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and the role that love and marriage play in it, we must understand his concept of recognition. It is a mistake, however, to think as some do that mutual recognition between equals is sufficient for Sittlichkeit. Rather, for Hegel, the more significant and powerful the recognizer, the more real the recognized. Ultimately recognition must come from spirit (Geist). Understanding this will allow us to see, despite Hegel, that he can capture, better than other theorists, many of the central concerns of contemporary same-sex marriage proponents and help provide them a philosophical underpinning.

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Philip J. Kain
Santa Clara University

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