Samuel J. M. Kahn
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis
In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing for Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to their beliefs. I then point out three different ways in which Kant or a present-day Kantian might defend this position. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal theory and his ethical theory
Keywords Kant  willing and believing  categorical imperative
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DOI 10.5840/ipq20145208
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