Psychological Review 125 (2):131-164 (2018)

Authors
Guy Kahane
Oxford University
Brian D. Earp
Oxford University
Julian Savulescu
Oxford University
Abstract
Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutili- tarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people’s attitudes toward instrumental harm—that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale—the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale—to dissociate individual differences in the ‘negative’ (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and ‘positive’ (impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research.
Keywords Utilitarianism  Deontology  Beneficence  Harm  Impartiality  Moral Psychology  Trolley Problem  Cognitive Science of Ethics
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DOI 10.1037/rev0000093
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Rationalism on the Brain.Joshua May - forthcoming - Mind and Language.

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