Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):421 - 437 (2010)

Authors
Adam Kadlac
Wake Forest University
Abstract
This paper explores the debate between personists, who argue that the concept of a person if of central importance for moral thought, and personists, who argue that the concept of a human being is of greater moral significance. On the one hand, it argues that normative naturalism, the most ambitious defense of the humanist position, fails to identify moral standards with standards of human behavior and thereby fails to undermine the moral significance of personhood. At the same time, it contends that a more focused attention on the morally relevant features of human life may indeed play a crucial role in enhancing our moral understanding
Keywords Personhood  Moral theory  Humanism  Personism  Moral status
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-009-9214-2
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Indeterminacy Objection.Scott Woodcock - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):20-41.

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