Abstract

The paper examines Plato's Lysis from the vantage point of the Aristotelian contention in the Poetics that the Socratic Conversation is a poem. A poem is an imitation of things possible to men of the then present day. It is from such imitations that we "gather up the meaning of things" . ;Although the traditional treatment of Platonic works sanctions and encourages the separation of the philosophy from the imitation, this paper seeks to explore how far the artistic dimensions of the dialogue generate, display, and advance philosophic contentions. The point of departure is that the Lysis imitates a conversation about friendship in which the participants begin making friends. The exhortation of the dialogue is to have and explore conversations such as the one imitated by Lysis in order to make friends and generate friendships. ;Because of the weight and emphasis on friends and friendship in Nicomachean Ethics, our gleaning any additional details as to their making will help flesh out Aristotelian contentions and concerns. I put forward the Lysis as a text that accomplishes this end. ;Socrates is the dramatic protagonist of the dialogue. He is Plato's imitation of a philosopher. Socrates is shown to befriend the other characters in the dialogue by engaging them in conversation in ways that elaborate Aristotle's tripartite division of friendship in Nicomachean Ethics. Through the dramatic action of the Lysis, Socrates enacts two distinct recipes for making friends. These recipes are examined alongside Aristotle's Golden Mean. ;Dramatically, the Lysis enfolds two completely distinct conversations. Because it is a remembrance by Socrates to an unseen listener, the conversation occurring in the dramatic present provides one recipe for friendship. The remembered conversation took place within the dramatic past in the palaestra. That conversation conveys a quite different recipe for the making of friends. Taken together, these recipes show or establish a portrait of the character of one who could be the "rare" friend, the pleasure friend, and the utility friend on Aristotle's view