Kant’s Theory of Practical Reason

The Monist 72 (3):363 - 383 (1989)
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Abstract

Contemporary discussions of practical reason often refer vaguely to the Kantian conception of reasons as an alternative to various means-ends theories, but it is rarely clear what this is supposed to be, except that somehow moral concerns are supposed to fare better under the Kantian conception. The theories of Nagel, Gewirth, Darwall, and Donagan have been labeled “Kantian” because they deviate strikingly from standard preference models, but their roots in Kant have not been traced in detail and important differences may go unnoticed. All this is not surprising, of course, because Kant’s conception of practical reason is inseparable from his ideas of freedom, which are notoriously difficult and controversial. It is hard enough to characterize these ideas accurately in Kantian terminology, harder still to explain them in terms of contemporary debates about reasons for action.

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Citations of this work

The hypothetical imperative?Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):357 – 372.
Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?Jeremy Schwartz - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):84-107.
Kant’s Quasi‐Eudaimonism.Erica A. Holberg - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):317-341.

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