The sky over canberra: Folk discourse and serious metaphysics

Philosophia 38 (2):365-383 (2010)
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I take up the task of examining how someone who takes seriously the ambitious programme of conceptual analysis advocated by the Canberra School can minimise the eliminative consequences which I argue the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis recipe of conceptual analysis is likely to have for many folk discourses. The objective is to find a stable means to preserve the constative appearance of folk discourse and to find it generally successful in its attempts to describe an external world, albeit in non-scientific terms that do not reflect the nature of things. The view I settle on, quasi-fictionalism, is modelled on a modified descriptivist version of Kendall Walton’s account of prop-oriented games of make-believe.



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Andrew Jorgensen
Temple University (PhD)

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How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.

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