Moral Necessity, Agent Causation, and the Determination of Free Actions in Clarke and Leibniz

In Marco Haussman & Jorg Nöller (eds.), Free Will: Historical and Analytic Perspectives. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 165-202 (2021)
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Abstract

On the standard interpretation, Samuel Clarke and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz endorse fundamentally different theories of free will. Clarke is typically interpreted as a libertarian who holds that freedom requires indeterminism. Leibniz, in contrast, is typically interpreted as a compatibilist who holds that free actions can be determined. This chapter challenges the standard interpretation and argues that Clarke and Leibniz agree almost completely about free will. Both require free actions to be instances of agent causation, and both view freedom as compatible with moral necessity or the determination by motives, reasons, or final causes. Hence, both Leibniz and Clarke should be interpreted as proponents of compatibilism.

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Julia Jorati
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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