Synthese 112 (1):75-96 (1997)
AbstractKitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive accounts can legitimately be termed explanatory. This is not what we find in actual scientific practice. In this paper, I attempt to reconcile these ideas. I claim that Kitcher's theory picks out ideal explanations, but that our term explanation is used to cover other accounts that have a certain relationship with the ideal accounts. At times, versions and portions of ideal explanations can also be considered explanatory.
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References found in this work
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.
Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1986 - MIT Press.
The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding.Henk W. de Regt & Dennis Dieks - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):137-170.
Selection and the Extent of Explanatory Unification.Robert A. Skipper - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):209.
Unification – It's Magnificent but is It Explanation?Ilpo Halonen & Jaakko Hintikka - 1999 - Synthese 120 (1):27-47.
Explanation = Unification? A New Criticism of Friedman’s Theory and a Reply to an Old One.Roche William & Sober Elliott - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (3):391-413.
Reconstructing Design, Explaining Artifacts: Philosophical Reflections on the Design and Explanation of Technical Artifacts.G. J. De Ridder - unknown
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