Illusory possibilities and imagining counterparts

Acta Analytica 19 (32):19-43 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Given Kripke’s semantic views, a statement, such as ‘Water is H 2 O’, expresses a necessary a posteriori truth. Yet it seems that we can conceive that this statement could have been false; hence, it appears that we can conceive impossible states of affairs as holding. Kripke used a de dicto strategy and a de re strategy to address three illusions that arise with respect to necessary a posteriori truths: (1) the illusion that a statement such as ‘Water is H 2 O’ possibly expresses a falsehood, (2) the illusion that conceivability can fail to latch on to a genuine metaphysical possibility, and (3) the illusion that one can access a real metaphysical possibility by conceiving that water is not H 2 O. In this paper I argue that while Kripke’s de dicto strategy dispels (1), his strategies do not enable him to dispel (2) and (3).



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,560

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A psychological definition of illusion.Robert I. Reynolds - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):217-223.
Imagining possibilities.Dominic Gregory - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):327–348.
There is no stream of consciousness.Susan J. Blackmore - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):17-28.
Illusion, hallucination and the problem of truth.Daya Krishna - 2003 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 20 (4):129-146.
Meta-conceivability.Philip Corkum - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):12.


Added to PP

103 (#153,698)

6 months
1 (#1,011,292)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

J. Jones
Biola University

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

View all 14 references / Add more references