Ratio 13 (1):69–82 (2000)

Troy Jollimore
California State University, Chico
Consequentialism involves a kind of strong impartiality which seems incompatible with the sort of partiality manifested in friendships. Consequentialists such as Kagan respond that friendship does not, in fact, require partiality. Against this, I argue that friendship cannot exist without expressions of personal feeling, and that such expressions necessarily involve a kind of partiality. Because her every action is determined by the goal of maximizing the impersonal good, a consequentialist cannot use her actions (including actions of speech) to express her feelings for her fellows. I argue that we should expect this problem to afflict sophisticated as well as straightforward consequentialism. Finally, I consider and reject the suggestion that the consequentialist agent, who has no particular friends, can be considered a friend to everybody.
Keywords partiality  friendship  consequentialism
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00109
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Impartiality.Troy Jollimore - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Friends Without Favoritism.Mark Bernstein - 2007 - Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (1):59-76.
The Coach-Athlete Relationship: How Close Is Too Close?Sheryle Bergmann Drewe - 2002 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 29 (2):174-181.

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