The paradox of indicative conditionals

Philosophical Studies 83 (1):93 - 112 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his 1987 book _Conditionals, Frank Jackson presents an argument to the effect that the indicative conditionals of natural language have the same truth conditions as the material conditional of truth-functional logic. This Jackson refers to as the "paradox of indicative conditionals." I offer a solution to this paradox by arguing that some conditionals that appear to be in the indicative mood are actually subjunctives, to which the paradox does not apply. I support this proposed solution with some historical observations on the evolution of the English verb phrase. (edited)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,748

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
99 (#223,575)

6 months
6 (#683,963)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Johnston
University of Windsor

References found in this work

A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1987 - New York: Blackwell. Edited by Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):626-628.

View all 7 references / Add more references