The paradox of indicative conditionals

Philosophical Studies 83 (1):93 - 112 (1996)
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Abstract

In his 1987 book _Conditionals, Frank Jackson presents an argument to the effect that the indicative conditionals of natural language have the same truth conditions as the material conditional of truth-functional logic. This Jackson refers to as the "paradox of indicative conditionals." I offer a solution to this paradox by arguing that some conditionals that appear to be in the indicative mood are actually subjunctives, to which the paradox does not apply. I support this proposed solution with some historical observations on the evolution of the English verb phrase. (edited)

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References found in this work

Philosophical papers.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.

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