Should Social Preferences Be Consistent?

Economics and Philosophy 5 (1):7 (1989)
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Abstract

Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question

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John Broome
University Of Oxford

Citations of this work

Philosophy of economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory.Stephen Morris - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):227.
The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty.Tyler Cowen - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (2):253.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Liberty and social choice.Amartya Sen - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):5-28.
Utilitarianism and expected utility.John Broome - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (8):405-422.

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