Propositional Knowledge and Belief: Entailment or Mutual Exclusion?

Philosophical Investigations 5 (2):135-141 (1982)
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2008

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10.1111/j.1467-9205.1982.tb00019.x

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Citations of this work

Knowledge requires belief – and it doesn’t? On belief as such and belief necessary for knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):151-167.

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Can one believe what one knows?O. R. Jones - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):220-235.

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