Res Publica 23 (2):245-53 (2017)

Kyle Johannsen
Trent University
G. A. Cohen’s claim that fundamental principles are ‘fact-insensitive’ has not received an especially warm welcome from the philosophical community. While some philosophers have expressed doubts about the plausibility of his claim, others have complained that even if his thesis is true, it is also relatively insignificant. In my paper, I argue that the fact-insensitivity thesis, if true, provides considerable support for value pluralism, and is thus of interest for that reason. Though Cohen himself assumes a plurality of fundamental principles, he never argues that the fact-insensitivity thesis supports this assumption. One of my paper’s aims, then, is to fill an argumentative gap in Cohen’s meta-ethical framework.
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DOI 10.1007/s11158-016-9334-1
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References found in this work BETA

Rescuing Justice and Equality.G. Cohen (ed.) - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
Plural and Conflicting Values.Michael Stocker - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances.Adam Swift - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (3):363-387.
Subject Index.G. A. Cohen - 2008 - In Rescuing Justice and Equality. Harvard University Press. pp. 425-430.

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