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Morally, We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):817-821 (2015)
Abstract
In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant wayAuthor's Profile
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Morally, should we prefer never to have existed?Saul Smilansky - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):655-666.
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