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Inference and Inductive Risk in Disorders of Consciousness
American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (1):35-43 (2016)
Abstract
Several types of inferences are employed in the diagnosis and prognosis of patients with brain injuries and disorders of consciousness. These inferences introduce unavoidable uncertainty, and can be evaluated in light of inductive risk: the epistemic and nonepistemic risks of being wrong. This article considers several ethically significant inductive risks generated by and interacting with inferences about patients with disorders of consciousness, and argues for prescriptive measures to manage and mitigate inductive risk in the context of disorders of consciousness.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
What Justifies the Allocation of Health Care Resources to Patients with Disorders of Consciousness?Andrew Peterson, Sean Aas & David Wasserman - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):127-139.
Should We Treat Vegetative and Minimally Conscious Patients as Persons?Matthew Braddock - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (2):267-280.
The Sources of Uncertainty in Disorders of Consciousness.L. Syd M. Johnson & Christos Lazaridis - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (2):76-82.
The Ableism of Quality of Life Judgments in Disorders of Consciousness: Who Bears Epistemic Responsibility?Joel Michael Reynolds - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (1):59-61.
Pure Experience and Disorders of Consciousness.Laura Specker Sullivan - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (2):107-114.
References found in this work
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?Russell A. Poldrack - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):59-63.
More dead than dead: Perceptions of persons in the persistent vegetative state.Kurt Gray, T. Anne Knickman & Daniel M. Wegner - 2011 - Cognition 121 (2):275-280.
Paper: The right to die in the minimally conscious state.L. Syd M. Johnson - 2011 - Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (3):175-178.
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