Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (3):436–452 (2008)

James Scott Johnston
Memorial University of Newfoundland
My task in this paper is to demonstrate, contra Nel Noddings, that Kantian ethics does not have an expectation of treating those closest to one the same as one would a stranger. In fact, Kantian ethics has what I would consider a robust statement of how it is that those around us come to figure prominently in the development of one's ethics. To push the point even further, I argue that Kantian ethics has an even stronger claim to treating those closest to oneself as imperative than Noddings and sentiment-based ethical theory in general, proposes.
Keywords Kantian ethics  moral education  Nel Noddings  sentiments  ethics  Immanuel Kant
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DOI 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00354.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
The Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Why There is No Education Ethics Without Principles.Janez Krek & Blaž Zabel - 2017 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 49 (3):284-293.

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