Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (1):143-165 (2018)

Authors
John Danaher
University College, Galway
Abstract
Rape and sexual assault are major problems. In the majority of sexual assault cases consent is the central issue. Consent is, to borrow a phrase, the ‘moral magic’ that converts an impermissible act into a permissible one. In recent years, a handful of companies have tried to launch consent apps which aim to educate young people about the nature of sexual consent and allow them to record signals of consent for future verification. Although ostensibly aimed at addressing the problems of rape and sexual assault on university campuses, these apps have attracted a number of critics. In this paper, I subject the phenomenon of consent apps to philosophical scrutiny. I argue that the consent apps that have been launched to date are unhelpful because they fail to address the landscape of ethical and epistemic problems that arise in the typical rape or sexual assault case: they produce distorted and decontextualised records of consent which may in turn exacerbate the other problems associated with rape and sexual assault. Furthermore, because of the tradeoffs involved, it is unlikely that app-based technologies could ever be created that would significantly address the problems of rape and sexual assault.
Keywords Criminal law  Sexual Assault  Consent  Rape  Rape Myths  Applied Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11572-017-9417-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Sex, Lies, and Consent.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):717-744.
Consent to Sexual Relations.Alan Wertheimer - 2006 - Law and Philosophy 25 (2):267-287.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Presupposition and Consent.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2020 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 6 (4):Article 4.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy.Jeffrey A. Gauthier - 1999 - In Keith Burgess-Jackson (ed.), A Most Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-91.
Sexual Assault and the Mens Rea Problem: The Empathic Approach.Kristie Hirschenberger - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Sex Education and Rape.Michelle J. Anderson - 2010 - Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 17 (1).
A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape.Robin West - 1996 - Legal Theory 2 (3):233-251.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-03-31

Total views
1,252 ( #4,472 of 2,506,031 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
57 ( #14,736 of 2,506,031 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes