What Can Mechanisms Do for You? Mechanisms and the Problem of Confounders in the Social Sciences

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (3):210-231 (2019)
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Abstract

The idea that mechanisms are crucially important to differentiate between genuine and spurious causal relations is ubiquitous both in the philosophical and in the social scientific literature. Yet...

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Maria Jimenez-Buedo
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

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References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Rethinking mechanistic explanation.Stuart Glennan - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S342-353.
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation.Stuart Glennan - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S342-S353.

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