Abstract

A commentary on the arguments whereby Hume endeavored to delimit the role of reason in morality. Harrison’s procedure is largely one of logical analysis: he identifies individual arguments, examines inferences, asks whether there are reasons to believe premises. Throughout, he displays a balanced, appreciative approach, and when obliged to draw attention to Hume’s mistakes, he does so only reluctantly. Over half of the book is taken up in a careful examination of the text which, in terms of clarity and penetration, goes beyond previous studies of Hume’s ethics. Additionally, Harrison offers chapters on Hume’s general epistemology and on the classical is/ought passage. In the latter he declares that Hume quite obviously thought that the derivation of an ought from an is was impossible, and then goes on, in what he labels an independent treatment of the problem, to offer a subtle exploration on the contours of our usage of the language of evaluation and obligation. But perhaps the most valuable contribution of the book is the closing section in which Harrison endeavors to arrive at a depiction of Hume’s alternative to rationalism. He puts forward five distinct interpretations of Hume’s positive moral philosophy, each of which has textual support as well as its own advocates. Harrison finds no grounds for affirming that any one of these interpretations defeats the others. Concluding with the judgment that Hume was confused in expounding his own position, the author notes that "Hume himself would not have approved of a reverence which substituted a superficial acceptance for a thorough grasp and realistic appraisal of his opinions." Despite the opposition which his work may provoke from those who defend some single interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy, Harrison’s study may be expected to become a standard reference work on Hume’s ethics.—J.T.K.