Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499 (2008)

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Abstract
In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. Instead I recommend we follow Pavel Tichý in construing both predication and extensionalization as instances of the primitive operation of functional application.
Keywords C. McGinn  extensionalization  functional application  G. Bealer  P. Tichý  possible-world semantics  predication  simple type theory  transparent intensional logic
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-007-9079-6
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References found in this work BETA

Quality and Concept.George Bealer - 1982 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Frege’s Logic.Pavel Tichý - 1988 - Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
Quality and Concept.George Bealer - 1983 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (3):347-348.

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Citations of this work BETA

Anatomy of a Proposition.Bjørn Jespersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1285-1324.
The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information.Marie Duží - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.

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