Anatomy of a proposition

Synthese 196 (4):1285-1324 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper addresses the mereological problem of the unity of structured propositions. The problem is how to make multiple parts interact such that they form a whole that is ultimately related to truth and falsity. The solution I propose is based on a Platonist variant of procedural semantics. I think of procedures as abstract entities that detail a logical path from input to output. Procedures are modeled on a function/argument logic, but are not functions. Instead they are higher-order, fine-grained structures. I identify propositions with particular kinds of molecular procedures containing multiple sub-procedures as parts. Procedures are among the basic entities of my ontology, while propositions are derived entities. The core of a structured proposition is the procedure of predication, which is an instance of the procedure of functional application. The main thesis I defend is that procedurally conceived propositions are their own unifiers detailing how their parts interact so as to form a unit. They are not unified by one of their constituents, e.g., a relation or a sub-procedure, on pain of regress. The relevant procedural semantics is Transparent Intensional Logic, a hyperintensional, typed λ-calculus, whose λ-terms express four different kinds of procedures. While demonstrating how the theory works, I place my solution in a wider historical and systematic context.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Should Propositions Proliferate?Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):243-251.
Knowability and epistemic truth.M. Hand - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.
Parts of Propositions.Cody Gilmore - 2014 - In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-208.
Hyperintensional propositions.Mark Jago - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):585-601.
Russellova rana metafizika propozicija.Anssi Korhonen - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.
Propositions, representation, and truth.Geoff Georgi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1019-1043.
Introduction.Marie Duží & Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):525-534.
The Unity of the Proposition.Peter Hanks - 2002 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
The Eternal Existence of True Propositions.Mark Steven Roberts - 1987 - Dissertation, University of Dallas
Richard Gaskin: The Unity of the Proposition. [REVIEW]Laurynas Adomaitis - 2012 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106-111.
Can concepts be defined in terms of sets?Marie Duží & Pavel Materna - 2010 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 19 (3):195-242.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-15

Downloads
72 (#223,965)

6 months
14 (#168,878)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Parts: a study in ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.
What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

View all 52 references / Add more references