Authors
Sofia M.I. Jeppsson
Umeå University
Abstract
When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. Delusions and psychosis are often seen as marking the end of intelligibility. In this paper, I argue first for the importance of seeing other people as intelligible as long as this is at all possible. Second, I argue, based on both previous literature and my own lived experience, that more psychotic phenomena than previously thought can be rendered at least somewhat intelligible. Besides bizarre experiences like illusions, hallucinations and intense feelings of significance, I also explain what it is like to lose one’s bedrock, and how this loss impacts which beliefs one has reason to reject. Finally, I give an inside account of some disturbances of reason, and show that there are important similarities between certain psychotic reasoning problems and common non-pathological phenomena.
Keywords delusion  lived experience  two-factor account  empiricist account  understanding  bedrock
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1353/ppp.2021.0036
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Overcoming Hermeneutical Injustice in Mental Health: A Role for Critical Phenomenology.Rosa Ritunnano - forthcoming - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology:1-18.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Universal Gravitation and the (Un)Intelligibility of Natural Philosophy.Matias Slavov - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):129-157.
Heidegger, Dreyfus, and the Intelligibility of Practical Comportment.Leslie A. MacAvoy - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (1):68-86.
On the Grammar of "Psychosis".Markus L. A. Heinimaa - 2000 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 3 (1):39-46.
Schmitz, Jordan, and Wallace on Intelligibility.Nicholas Lobkowicz - 1984 - Review of Metaphysics 38 (1):57 - 68.
Temporality in Psychosis: Loss of Lived Time in an Alien World.Marina Marren - 2015 - The Humanistic Psychologist 43 (2):148-159.
Psychotic Consciousness.Peter Chadwick - 2001 - International Journal of Social Psychiatry 47 (1):52-62.
Response to Hubert Dreyfus and Nancy Sherman.Jonathan Lear - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):81 - 93.
Positive Functions of Psychosis.Willem H. J. Martens - 2010 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 41 (2):216-233.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-06-10

Total views
78 ( #148,303 of 2,506,110 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #15,095 of 2,506,110 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes