Abstract

Epistemological scientific realism is the doctrine that we know that at least some theoretical entities exist and hence our belief in the existence of some such entities is justified. The denial of it is epistemological antiscientific realism. ;Since 1980 Bas C. van Fraassen has been the preeminent epistemological antiscientific realist. He holds that no one can be justified in believing in the existence of theoretical entities such as electrons because those entities are unobservable, and there is no acceptable basis for inferring from observables to unobservables. I argue against both claims. In particular, I argue that our belief in some such entities like electrons is justified, since we can use them in experiments as causal tools or practical tools that effect some changes in other parts of the world. ;My epistemological scientific realism is very similar to Hacking's Experimental Realism. He holds that even if there is no final argument for or against realism at the level of representation or theorizing, we have sufficient evidence for the belief that some theoretical entities such as electrons really do exist at the level of experimentation; and the evidence is experimental manipulability or use of them as causal tools. In order to make our Experimental Realism more robust, I add something to fill in the gaps of his account. In particular, I add an explanation of how we know that we are actually using such entities. In recent years, there have been several criticisms of Hacking's view. I critically examine them and show that they are not correct. ;Consequently, I defeat van Fraassen's epistemological challenge to scientific realism and defend my epistemological scientific realism or Experimental Realism