Measuring the size of a benefit and its moral weight On the significance of John Broome's: “Interpersonal Addition Theorem”

Theoria 61 (1):25-60 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Broome and the intuition of neutrality.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411.
Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle.Erik Carlson - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):449-463.
Fairness.Brad Hooker - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):329 - 352.
Suffering and moral responsibility.Jamie Mayerfeld - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The mere addition paradox, parity and vagueness.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):129–151.
The moral significance of collective entities.Keith Graham - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):21 – 41.
Weighing Reasons.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):70-86.
Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
Broome on Moral Goodness and Population Ethics.Peter Vallentyne - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):739 - 746.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-13

Downloads
41 (#379,234)

6 months
5 (#629,136)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The priority view.David McCarthy - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):215–57.
Utilitarianism and prioritarianism II.David McCarthy - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):1-33.
Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism II.David McCarthy - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):1-33.
Utilitarianism and prioritarianism I.David Mccarthy - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):335-363.
Reconsidering the value of equality.Iwao Hirose - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):301-312.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance.James Griffin - 1986 - Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press.

View all 12 references / Add more references