Liar-like paradox and object language features

American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):67 - 73 (2008)
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Abstract

We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).

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Author Profiles

Carrie Jenkins
University of British Columbia
Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
Critical notice of spandrels of truth by J.c. Beall.C. S. Jenkins - 2010 - Philosophical Books 51 (4):245-254.

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References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.

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