Abstract

My aim in this dissertation is to explain and to defend the thesis that the main moral argument of Plato's Republic is an attempt to define justice by showing how it contributes to happiness. After giving an account of the structure of the dialogue's main argument, I defend this thesis against two principal objections. ;First, some argue that in Book II Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is good "in itself" and apart from its connection to any other good, including happiness and pleasure. I argue that this objection arises from a misinterpretation of Glaucon's classification of goods and imports an anachronistic conception of intrinsic value. On my view, Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is a good which contributes to happiness by itself, or on its own, and that we should welcome justice for itself because of this contribution. I also canvass some common proposals about exactly how justice is related to happiness: justice is a cause of happiness, justice is a part of happiness, and justice is identical to happiness. I argue that there is something wrong with each of these proposals; I begin to develop an account of the relationship between justice and happiness which builds on the Book I function argument. ;Second, it is sometimes argued that in the middle books Plato implies that the philosopher-ruler will choose justice--as well as everything else--not because it is conducive to his own happiness but because it is good simpliciter. This, too, seems to suggest that Plato ultimately means to defend justice apart from its connection to happiness. I argue that this objection misinterprets the role the Form of the Good plays in the Republic. The Form of the Good is a model to which the philosopher looks when he frames his own conception of happiness, and it figures prominently in the content of his own conception of happiness, but it does not simply replace happiness as the philosopher's ultimate practical aim. Finally, I discuss a common objection to Plato's defense of justice: Plato's philosopher is ultimately selfish, for he treats others justly only in order to preserve his own inner harmony. This objection is misguided, for, as I point out, the philosopher cares about his own inner harmony not for any overtly selfish reason but because it mirrors the harmony of the Forms. It seems more accurate to say that Plato faces a problem of selflessness than to say that he faces a problem of selfishness