Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2008)
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Abstract

Carrie Jenkins presents a new account of arithmetical knowledge, which manages to respect three key intuitions: a priorism, mind-independence realism, and empiricism. Jenkins argues that arithmetic can be known through the examination of empirically grounded concepts, non-accidentally accurate representations of the mind-independent world.

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Carrie Jenkins
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

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