Indefinite probability judgment: A reply to Levi

Philosophy of Science 54 (4):586-591 (1987)
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Abstract

Isaac Levi and I have different views of probability and decision making. Here, without addressing the merits, I will try to answer some questions recently asked by Levi (1985) about what my view is, and how it relates to his.

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10.1086/289407

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Citations of this work

Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.
Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.

View all 8 references / Add more references