Abstract

Normative ethical theories can be classified into two broad categories: Teleological theories are those that regard an act or policy as right, just in case it brings about the best overall consequences for persons; Deontological theories typically place more or less absolute constraints on certain forms of conduct, irrespective of whether, in particular circumstances, instances of these forms produce the best overall consequences. The question of whether, and to what extent, members of present generations have moral obligations to future persons challenges traditional moral theories in a number of ways. The most serious challenge of late is what is sometimes called the nonidentity problem. This problem arises in virtue of the fact that future persons who would exist as a result of our adopting one course of action are often nonidentical with future persons who would exist as a result of our choosing some other course of action. Therefore, present persons can apparently justify a wide range of actions by appealing to the fact that no particular persons are made worse off than they otherwise would be. The central aim of the dissertation is to evaluate whether representative moral theories can provide the philosophical underpinnings for obligations to future generations, in light of challenges posed by the nonidentity problem. A critical account of recent attempts to establish obligations vis-a-vis Teleological theories is defended; the theories considered are different versions of utilitarianism. The outcome is that the preferred approach is a rights-based Deontological theory