Multi-model ensembles in climate science: Mathematical structures and expert judgements

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 83 (C):44-52 (2020)
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Abstract

Projections of future climate change cannot rely on a single model. It has become common to rely on multiple simulations generated by Multi-Model Ensembles (MMEs), especially to quantify the uncertainty about what would constitute an adequate model structure. But, as Parker points out (2018), one of the remaining philosophically interesting questions is: “How can ensemble studies be designed so that they probe uncertainty in desired ways?” This paper offers two interpretations of what General Circulation Models (GCMs) are and how MMEs made of GCMs should be designed. In the first interpretation, models are combinations of modules and parameterisations; an MME is obtained by “plugging and playing” with interchangeable modules and parameterisations. In the second interpretation, models are aggregations of expert judgements that result from a history of epistemic decisions made by scientists about the choice of representations; an MME is a sampling of expert judgements from modelling teams. We argue that, while the two interpretations involve distinct domains from philosophy of science and social epistemology, they both could be used in a complementary manner in order to explore ways of designing better MMEs.

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Julie Jebeile
University of Bern

Citations of this work

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Expert judgment in climate science: How it is used and how it can be justified.Mason Majszak & Julie Jebeile - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 100 (C):32-38.

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References found in this work

Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of Global Climate Models.Eric Winsberg - 2012 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):111-137.
Holism, entrenchment, and the future of climate model pluralism.Johannes Lenhard & Eric Winsberg - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (3):253-262.
Values and evidence: how models make a difference.Wendy S. Parker & Eric Winsberg - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):125-142.

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